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A Genealogy of Genocide in Francoist Spain1
Antonio Miguez Macho

Marie Curie Fellow, Contemporary and American History Department
University of Santiago de Compostela
Summary: The extermination that was associated with the violence of the Spanish Civil War period and the early 1940s
has been studied in depth in recent decades. Until now, however, the concept of genocide has not been discussed with an eye
to understanding and interpreting this violence. The hermeneutical and comparative potential of the concept is, however,
unquestionable. This article aims both to contextualize the origin and development of the debates about the concept of
genocide, and to show what the concept could add to the debate in the case of Spain. In particular, this paper proposes to apply
the concept of genocidal practice to the study of the Francoist violence, through analysis of the discourses, the reasons for the
violence, and the memories of the events. From this point of view, an analysis will be made of the relationship between the
practice of genocidal violence and the discourses of denial devoted to preserving the impunity of the perpetrators to this very
day in Spain.
Keywords: genocidal practice, Francoist violence, memory, amnesty, impunity, Spain.
Date of peer-review approval: November 20, 2012

The story of Juana and Francisco
The lifeless body of Juana Capdevielle was found tossed in a ditch along the highway between A Coruña
and Madrid, near the village of Rábade in the province of Lugo. The entry in the Office of Vital Statistics makes
reference to the discovery of the corpse of an unidentified woman, around 30 years old, with the cause of
death given as “gunshots to her chest and head.” Among her belongings were a 5-centavo coin, a silver watch,
and a ring on the middle finger of her right hand. Those who murdered her were concerned with making
it clear that their crime was not an everyday robbery, and they had further taken the opportunity to rape
the young woman before executing her. She was a newlywed, and her belongings included the gifts she had
received on her wedding day in March 1936. Her deceased husband, Francisco Pérez Carballo, had been the
gobernador civil of the province of A Coruña. He was executed in the provincial capital, along with the key
personnel of that city’s security forces, on the same day he was tried—on July 24—after a sham court-martial
of which no written evidence remains. Juana, a librarian and archivist by profession, also was greatly involved
in the institutional activity of her partner in those spring days in 1936. For that reason, she was especially
detested among the most reactionary media. Both, Francisco and Juana, were killed between July and August
1936. The first crime took place when Galicia had not yet fallen completely into the hands of the leaders of
the coup; the second, now in August, was carried out after Juana had been arrested, freed, and finally arrested
again, when the front lines of the war were already far from the “tranquil” lands of Galicia, and the insurgents
and their backers were in complete control of the situation.
It is one more story among the many that form the jigsaw puzzle of incidents of violence that took place
in that context. Indeed, it was a great mosaic that was composed of hundreds, thousands, of personal histories,
testimonies, and documents, too, which make it possible to give an account, partial though it may be, of the
events experienced in Spain, beginning in July 1936. Undoubtedly, knowledge of the specific cases, including
the local or regional point of view as well, influences the perspective we adopt in reflecting on them. All this
detail in the knowledge of the individual cases has resulted, on numerous occasions, in a lack of conceptual
and comparative thought about their historical significance. In any event, it seems more than appropriate to
explicitly discuss the fundamental aspects of a debate so often mentioned, one that in addition is linked with
the question of historical memory.2
The argument of this article starts from a gamble that is consciously risky and intentionally provocative:
to use the perspective of studies on genocide to account for the acts of violence in the area occupied by the
insurgents in Spain during the Civil War, which we call “Francoist violence” in an attempt to be concise. First,
it is necessary to clarify the meaning of genocide as a heuristic concept and point out its interpretive scope in
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what concerns us here. In addition, these conceptual clarifications are useful for addressing the second point
of this article: essentially, to point out both the interpretive and the comparative potential that the concept of
genocidal practice can bring to the study of this subject. And third, we will show how the concept of genocide
relates to the reconceptualization, in present studies on the “repression,” of so-called historical memory, public
policies of memory and reparation, and the legal and judicial aspect of it all.
Genocide: One concept and many misunderstandings
Looking in greater depth at the use and abuse of the concept of genocide, the historian sees, first, formative
gaps with respect to its meaning. Paradoxically, there is a lack of awareness that it is a neologism that arose
only recently in historical terms (not even seventy years ago) and has found undeniable acceptance not only
in academic and legal circles, but also among citizens. Clearly, the everyday use of the concept generally
equates its meaning with very serious events of mass killing, and the word is used, above all, to lend force and
emphasis. For the same reason, some authors have attempted to label the Francoist violence as “genocide” or
have characterized Franco and his associates as “guilty of genocide,” with an undisguised aspiration to employ a
word far more definitive than the terms they consider more or less neutral, such as “repression” or “oppressors.”3
It is essential to state that what is written here is by no means intended as denunciation or condemnation:
no claim is made that it is more conclusive, or even more definitive. The idea is to employ the concepts with
precision, in order to keep politicized attitudes from interfering in the research, and to avoid any trace of
“anti-Francoism,” an ideology that has been—and continues to be—dominant in a good number of the studies
of “repression,” encouraged by a certain social perspective that supports it. Breaking away from the discourse
of “anti-Francoism” means, in addition, abandoning an alleged and imagined specificity of the Spanish case
that eliminates reasonable possibilities for comparison—among other reasons, because the discourse of
“anti-Francoism” would become the Spanish version of the “antifascist” discourses in the European setting.
Nevertheless, “anti-Francoism,” as its name indicates, refers to a purely Spanish phenomenon that is unique
and controversial in nature. At the time, there was a prolific controversy, extremely interesting in some aspects,
about the “political nature” of the Franco regime, related to the previous question of the authentic nature of
the Spanish case, and complicated and shaded by European and international standards for a fascist regime.4
One fundamental aspect of this debate has been the strong conceptual differentiation that was established
between, on the one hand, the social, political, and ideological foundations of Franco’s dictatorship, as well as
its effective political practice, and, on the other hand, the enormous violence that accompanied its accession
to power. The areas of study seemed airtight, something that is difficult to sustain from the standpoint of
rigorous analysis of the facts. The deaths of Francisco and Juana, with which this essay began as examples of
many more such deaths, cannot be dissociated from the fascistic, National Catholic, or technocratic policies
that characterized Franco’s regime. Genocidal violence is not exclusive to one ideology or one particular
expression of policy, but rather is one of the mechanisms available to many ideological purposes with an
aspiration to reorganize the social sphere. It is, by definition, an ideological violence, because it entails the
construction of an enemy in order to destroy that same enemy. But it is a violence that is defined neither by
the number of its victims nor by its identitarian character, much less by alleged success or failure in the pursuit
of its immediate objectives of annihilation.5
The chief difficulty in understanding this use of the term “genocide” derives from the very nature of
the concept. By definition, genocide is a practice, not a result. This is precisely why it is not possible to ask
whether “genocide existed” in a concrete historical case by thinking in terms of the results of what occurred.
It is possible to ask whether there existed a practice of genocide on the basis of what occurred, in itself. The
origin of the term goes back specifically to a concern of a pre-emptive sort: to prevent a certain practice from
taking place and having devastating consequences for human beings and the societies they make up at the
time. Raphael Lemkin, the Polish lawyer and political scientist who coined the word, traces its use to the
study of certain historical cases, particularly that of the Armenians, which made an enormous impression
on him. Essentially, Lemkin was looking for a definition that would serve in the field of international law to
safeguard and protect populations from being subjected to certain types of extreme violence.6 It is a search
that dates back beyond Lemkin, at least to the mid-nineteenth century, when the development of international
humanitarian legislation began.7
Genocide, then, is not a concept invented in light of a single concrete experience, but rather the result of a
very long process of defining violence that takes on a new character, at least in the eyes of the person analyzing
it. In addition, the concept made possible the sought-after application of international legislation to crimes
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of this kind. That was not achieved after World War I, but would indeed have an effect following the end of
World War II.8
The path taken by the concept as regards legal matters is well known by scholars who deal with the subject.
After gaining international status through the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in its first
sessions in 1946, its meaning subtly changed to apply to legal effects in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. The specific context in which this definition was approved
has been discussed many times, and there is no need to reiterate here the vagueness and absurdity that were
introduced from the analytical point of view by the exclusion of political groups.9 This has been debated on
various levels, including the academic one, because the concept always retained an analytical dimension,
which had no need to take into account those kinds of legal agreements.10
At this point it must be stated that preference for the concept has to do with the conceptual precision it
provides, and that it is not necessarily exclusive, of course. If there were an extraordinary concept making it
possible to account for what “genocide” encompasses without losing any shade of meaning thereby, it would
be desirable to accept it and make extensive use of it. Thus far, extermination, political violence, repression,
persecution, and politicide are concepts that remain faulty in one or more aspects. In this sense, it should be
pointed out what exactly the meaning of genocide or “genocidal practice” contributes. The term “genocidal
practice” is used in this article to avoid any kind of confusion about its valid legal dimension or about any
nuances that the everyday use of the concept could provide:
a. It defines a violent process with the aim of eliminating a social group, based on the use of the
government’s own machinery and the state’s monopoly on theoretically legitimate violence.
b. As such a process, it is placed in a sequence, which necessarily begins with a more or less formal
definition of the characteristics of the social group whose elimination is sought, and of who this
group’s members are. It continues with a number of specific techniques of violence that try to
contribute to the aforementioned objective of destroying the social group seen as an adversary,
and it is followed by a phase of denial that crimes of such a kind have occurred.
c. The elimination of the social group, which is the aim of a genocidal practice, comes about to a
greater or lesser extent through the physical elimination of its members. Nonetheless, it is not
limited to this aspect but also involves destruction of the identitarian manifestations that define
the group as such from the perspective of the perpetrators.
d. Keeping in mind the involvement of the body politic, which is necessary for such a genocidal
practice to be accomplished as such, the whole of the society is concerned in its development,
whether from the position of victim or person affected by the measures of repression, or through
alignment, actively or passively, with the position of the executioners and persecutors.
Genocidal practice and violence on the home front of Franco’s rebels
The genealogy of the concept is an indispensable preliminary step, so that we can apply the term
“genocide” in a discerning way. Nevertheless, the great question is whether it has any interpretive potential
for historical analysis of the events that were triggered in Spain as a result of the July 1936 coup d’état. In
this context, social processes of classification and symbolization were activated, in which the construction
of the “Other” as enemy played a fundamental role.11 For the perpetrators, the position of these adversaries
was determined not by membership in any political organizations in particular but rather by a well-defined
identity. This political, social, and cultural identity was not created with the Republic but took decades to form,
feeding on common mobilizing experiences as well as experiences of repression. On various occasions, the
authority of the Spanish state would act against that very group in the population, which had been identified
as opposed to the “social order.”
In two revolutionary events in particular—in the general strike of August 1917 and the general strike
of October 1934—the machinery of the state had applied extraordinary measures of repression: there were
arrests of all the leaders, activists, and individuals seen as tied to the aforementioned group identity. And that
happened despite the fact that in the greater part of Spain’s territory, the two aforementioned cases of attempted
revolution did not turn out to be mere pipe-dreams. In both events, though no crime had specifically been
confirmed that would allow the detainees to be charged individually, the soldiers in charge of “restoring public
order” identified a group to which they attributed collective responsibility for the occurrences in question.
It is not surprising, therefore, that when 1936 arrived the leaders of the coup were so sure about whom they
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ought to go after, because they had spent decades attributing “qualities” to an enemy with whom they already
had had to deal.12
The first to be convinced of this common identity among the enemies of the “social order,” therefore,
were their opponents, who interpreted as a negative evil each and every one of the principles of citizenship
the others espoused. Thus, the universalization of civil and political rights was regarded as synonymous with
the radical egalitarianism that the Bolshevik revolution had enshrined. Further, the promulgation of social
rights was seen as the extermination of individual liberty, the limitation of repressive and arbitrary action was
regarded as weakness of the state, freedom of conscience as anti-clericalism, women’s rights as destruction
of the family, encouragement of alternative values as the destruction of traditional society, and recognition
of peoples’ right to self-government/autonomy as separatism. In the conspiracy theory, which was publicized
daily in the conservative media, in shared group meetings, and in everyday conversations, there began a
proliferation of ideas such as the hidden power of Freemasons or the influence of Judeo-Bolshevism.13
As noted earlier, within the conspiracy theory was included the assignment of a secret nature and calling to
the opponents, profoundly destructive in value and with repercussions for civilization. Thus, the perpetrators
are assigned the role of defenders not only of their group identity and their more or less private interests,
but also of the civilization they would represent together. Historically, this was the idea of “Christianity” or
“Western civilization,” if not both. The intellectual pedigree of such ideological constructs is rooted in the
crises of the Old Regime and in the shaping of the modern liberal nation-states. It takes on a new dimension,
however, with the extension of citizen status to increasingly broad sectors of society, something that takes
place in the Western world between the end of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth
century. In reality, not only the Jews or the Bolsheviks were the object of these identitarian precautions on the
part of broad sectors within modern Western societies; also affected were other groups such as Freemasons
and religious, sexual, and cultural dissidents, or even ethnic groups wanting their own national identity.14
These processes became part of a phenomenon of dehumanization in the way these groups were
characterized: “the most painful question about genocide is, how is it possible for people to kill other people
on such a massive scale? The answer seems to be that it is not possible, at least not as long as the potential
victims are perceived as people. We have no evidence that genocide was ever performed on a group of equals.
Not only must the victims not be equals, but also they must be clearly defined as something less than fully
human.”15 Normally, on this point, more propagandistic arguments are combined with support alleged to
be scientific or intellectual in nature. It was not only in the case of the Nazis with the Jews that antisemitic
propaganda was reinforced by a racist scientific discourse.
References to the subhuman nature of “the reds” (the republican faction) were made from the very start
of the Francoist uprising by the press that supported them, and were spread by the radio stations and repeated
in public, political, or religious events and ceremonies. Just look at the identification with worms, animals of
a very different kind, or the simile of disease. Ethnic consciousness was understood in this context as a force
for preserving the class that sustained and defended the regime instituted by the rebels, which in reality was
identified by ideology and, above all, by the will to destroy its enemies.16 As a result of this racist conviction,
it was believed that the evil of the “reds” was transmitted not only by ideology but also by blood. Hence, a
campaign was launched to take away the children of imprisoned mothers, putting them up for adoption by
families considered to be “in order.”17
In the case of Spain, a process of extermination paralleled the gradual taking of territory by the rebels.
It was an extermination that was, nevertheless, delimited in time, with the majority of the crimes, whether
committed by the method of direct murder or by legalized murder, concentrated in the months after the seizure
of each of the territories. In the places that were occupied in the very first days, the cycle of extermination was
concentrated in the second half of 1936 and much of 1937. In those places occupied toward the end of the war,
most of the victims were executed before the end of 1941.18
Presented below, in Figure 1, is a comparison of the total numbers of victims of violence who were killed
in the first three years of violence, taking as a reference the cases of two Spanish regions that experienced
different situations and two Latin American countries that experienced genocidal processes in the 1970s.
Developed by the present author on the basis of these data: for Argentina, Inés Izaguirre, “Una larga
tradición de prácticas genocidas normalizadas,” in Asociación Latinoamericana de Sociología, Latinoamérica
en y desde el mundo. Sociología y Ciencias Sociales ante el cambio de época: legitimidades en debate, XXVI
Congreso de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Sociología, August 13-18, 2007, Guadalajara, México; for Chile,
Patricio Orellana Vargas, “La represión en Chile, 1973-1989,” Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación,
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Figure 1. Percentage of the victims killed in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd year of the violence
Argentina (1976-1978), Chile (1973-1975), Galicia (1936-1938) and Madrid (1939-1941).
Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, Santiago de Chile, Secretaría de Comunicación
y Cultura, no date; for Galicia, L. Fernández Prieto and Proxecto “Nomes e Voces,” Informe de Resultados,
Santiago de Compostela, USC, 2009; and for Madrid, Julius Ruiz, Repression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil
War (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 101.
In the case of Galicia, strictly speaking, no civil war took place; instead, from the first days following
the 1936 coup d’état, the whole of the territory fell into the hands of the leaders of the coup. Therefore, the
violence developed from the first moment on and reached its peak of intensity in the period 1936-1938. In
the second Spanish case, Madrid, the dates refer to the time after the end of the Civil War, April 1939, because
until then the city had resisted the attacks of the Francoist rebels. In this case, most of the violent deaths were
concentrated between 1939 and 1941. If these lines are compared with the cases of Chile and Argentina, it is
confirmed that the types of liquidation violence are very similar as to the rates of extermination.
Various explanations have been written to account for this particular criminal chronology. Essentially,
these are interim explanations that made the process conditional, but they must be understood within the
meaning of genocidal practice. Every genocidal process has a number of phases; extermination is only one of
them. The Nazi genocide took place in successive stages, of which the extermination of the Jews meant only a
final and late stage. Meanwhile, the stigmatization and persecution of the Jews was preparation for what later
would be extermination in the gas chambers, regardless of whether it had already been decided upon or not.19
In this regard, there is an important disparity between the linear progressions of the various historical
cases of genocide, precisely because genocidal practice depends on the interaction existing among the different
social, economic, and cultural forces in a country. In this sense, the case of the Third Reich demonstrates how,
in this paradigm of a genocidal regime, the practical implementation of extermination plans was conditioned
by the current circumstances. One paradigmatic phenomenon might be the Aktion T4 program, which was
put into practice between 1939 and 1941—thus, prior to the bulk of the exterminations of Jews—and was
slowed and restrained in large part by protests arising from various sectors of German civil society. In the
course of this program, “persons considered incurably ill, children with hereditary defects, or ‘unproductive’
adults” were exterminated.20
One can reflect in that regard about the possible existence of a space that is always present in any society:
a space for resistance and for confronting oppression. The concept of totalitarianism, as a synonym for a
regime that actually obtains the ability to act with complete impunity, conceals social participation in the
genocidal violence, be that participation active or in the form of passive complicity. Tolerance for certain
forms of violence practiced under the protection of the state is based on the citizens’ acknowledgment of the
criminals as authority figures. The importance of Milgram’s findings in this regard is well known.21 Analysis
of the course of the extermination under Franco reveals that the taking of power by the insurgents granted
them the status of authorities in practice, despite the extreme illegality of the action by which they attained
that power. The same happens in the case of the coups d’état in Latin America that triggered practices of
extermination. The violence will produce differentiation between victims and executioners, between “the
drowned and the saved,” until a time has come when anyone who has not been the object of violence on its
various scales, ranging from murder to persecution, will become automatically exempt from its consequences.
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The society itself makes sure that difference becomes established, thereby intensifying support for the regime
and complicit silence regarding the massacre.22
The discourse of denial and impunity
The last stage of every genocidal practice is always denial of the genocide itself: “the perpetrators of
genocides dig up the mass graves, burn the bodies, try to cover up the evidence and intimidate the witnesses.
They deny that they committed any crimes, and often blame what happened on the victims.”23 All the resources
that were available to the state apparatus in developing the criminal actions are used subsequently to erase the
evidence of what took place, even many decades after the events. Therefore, legal arguments raised to avoid
prosecution of this type of criminality are the rule and not the exception. In the Spanish case, continuity of the
dictatorial regime was the best guarantee of the predominance of a systematic denial of any genocidal practice.
But it was the transition to democracy in the 1970s, known simply as the Transition, and Spanish society as a
whole that validated the pattern. To explain this complex way of denying the truth and misrepresenting what
was experienced in various social contexts, people turned to developing an entire theory of collective guilt in
societies with a genocidal past.24
In the genocidal practices, one can detect the construction of the discourse of denial at the moment of
crossing from a context of justification to the context of denial. The context of justification serves as preparation
for the genocidal practice and fosters its development by seeking to dehumanize the enemy or by appealing
to the logic of pillage. But the context of negation directly promotes the objective of concealing the crimes
of those responsible, both the perpetrators and the beneficiaries of these crimes. The first stages of transition
between the context of justification and the context of denial appear with the progressive marginalization of
the violence practiced by groups and militias, which is replaced with more structured military trials.
In the case of Spain, the groups that at the time were paid the warmest tributes are progressively displaced,
in some instances becoming the object of persecution and even sent to the European war fronts as part of the
División Azul.25 In this sense, there is nothing special in the practice of the Franco regime. One can recall what
the Nazis did in their time with the SA, as a way of consolidating the power of Hitler and his supporters on
the one hand, and on the other as part of a discourse intended to deny the “irregular” nature of the violence
practiced by the new regime. The violence practiced in the course of the Russian Revolution has as much to
do with a practice intended to eliminate “class enemies” as with the establishment in power of the Bolshevik
ruling elite in the society.26
Controlling one form of violence in order to continue practicing another form with impunity was also
part of the systems employed by the genocidal regimes in Latin America, when the time came to start shutting
down channels of irregular violence through “clandestine” mechanisms. If the initial violence of Franco’s
regime is seen in corpses that appear daily in roadside ditches or in places where all the neighbors can see
them, it is progressively changed into something much more secret. In this sense, a network of concentration
camps is created, camps that go beyond the temporary detention centers of the early period and, in addition,
perform functions of another kind, related to the “re-education” of the prisoners and forced laborers.27
On the other hand, the “normalization” of civilian life also starts with putting into operation the logic of
revenge and compassion. What until then had been complete indifference to the signs of suffering gives way
to acts of mercy toward the families of the victims and toward the survivors. These “displays of clemency”
serve in addition to strengthen loyalty to the regime and guarantee complicit silence. Thus, there follow cases
at the local level of employers who start rehiring the workers they had dismissed, parish prises who take
an interest in their parishioners, and measures that prohibit irregular violence, beatings, or extortion. But
beyond this, it becomes state policy with the first sentence reductions in 1943 and what would be large-scale
pardons by 1945. Evidently, the international context is an important factor for encouraging these practices
and whitewashing Franco’s regime. Far beyond this, however, the pardons guarantee social cohesion. What
had been at the time violence practiced with aims clearly involving extermination becomes changed into
this new discourse of denial in a series of disconnected practices resulting from a context of excesses that
frequently conceal personal acts of vengeance.28
The context of excesses as part of a logic of revenge is the first discourse of denial that, strictly speaking, is
developed within Spanish society with respect to the Francoist practice of extermination. Almost immediately
after the crimes occur, publications and flyers appear, giving a detailed account of what happened, pointing in
explanation to the criminal nature of the victims as well as to the situation of confusion generated by the absence
of authority in the early days. The discourse of denial, then, begins not by forgetting the crimes but by altering
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their significance and diluting their genocidal nature, something that is developed by part of the society itself to
differentiate itself from the victims or from those marked by the violence to some extent. Therefore, the public
politics of memory has been led, above all, by the actions sponsored by Franco’s regime itself. Most interesting of
all, without doubt, is the campaign celebrating the “25 years of peace” in the 1960s, because it has a significance
that goes far beyond mere justification of the regime and moves on to denial of the genocide.29
Starting with the period of the Transition, measures aimed at reparations for “the victims” begin to
be established. The sequence begins in 1976 with the awarding of economic compensation to veterans of
the Republican faction, or “bando republicano,” who were crippled in the Spanish Civil War. Later, in 1979,
would come general awarding of social rights and pensions to all the “Republican” combatants and their
family members. Interestingly, this same measure includes the voluntary militias that participated in the
revolutionary uprising in Asturias in 1934, equating them with the forces of the Spanish Republican Army.
Progressive additions meant that in 1984 there was economic compensation in certain cases for members
of the “Republican” security forces, and in 1990 for individuals who had been prisoners in Francoist Spain,
provided they had spent more than three years in prison.
Besides these kinds of measures, some autonomous regional governments launched initiatives along the
same lines, compensating in a different way the “victims and political prisoners of the Franco regime.” The
economic compensations paid to the victims and family members reflect an attempt to solve the problem
that “not all the victims” had been treated equally. The same idea is behind the resolution on condemnation
adopted in a unanimous vote by the Congress of Deputies on November 20, 2002. The concrete significance of
the condemnation is perfectly expressed by historian Ángeles Egido in her fiery defense of the parliamentary
declaration: “It was, without doubt, a gigantic step. It was very late in being taken, but finally it was taken, and
it is fitting only to be pleased at it, if only because of what the taking of it cost.
There is not the slightest doubt that it can be considered a milestone in the democratic memory of the
country and, perhaps, the perfect finishing touch to the transition. In the name of the well-known maxim of
[Manuel] Azaña, ‘Peace, pity, and pardon,’ pressure was put on the local governments to join in the search
for people who had disappeared and were buried in mass graves, thus contributing to equal rights for both
the victorious families and the vanquished ones when it is time to carry out a simple, and common, act of
humanity: to honor their dead with dignity, and publicly.”30
In this regard, it may be interesting to analyze a study by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
(CIS; Center for Sociological Research) in October 2005, just before the debate about the “recovery of
historical memory” began with more force, propelled by the initiatives of the central government and various
autonomous regional governments. The study is revealing because it shows the pulse of Spanish society in the
face of a number of questions about the “recognition of the victims of the Civil War.” The very posing of the
questions is a response to the well-known discourse of mixing war and genocide, partly because reference is
made to the “victims of the Civil War” and not to the victims of the violence on the home front, as if there
were no distinction to be made. Apart from this, it can be observed that the only points where the consensus
is quite broad are reached when it comes to questions referring to the need to guarantee equal treatment “to
the victims of the two sides.”
But if this is the majority sentiment in Spanish society, the law passed by Parliament in 2007, the
Ley de Memoria Histórica, or Historical Memory Law (this time, not unanimously), is even more explicit
in this respect. The law’s preliminary sections contain two fundamental paragraphs that show how the
real reason for the law is to give greater consistency to the denial that is part of the significance of the
Transition, because of the obvious burden of political (and moral) blame it holds for a good part of the
Spanish left wing. Thus, the first paragraph says, “The spirit of reconciliation and harmony and of respect
for pluralism and peaceful defense of all ideas that guided the Transition, enabled the establishment of
a Constitution for us, that of 1978, which legally expressed the desire of Spaniards for reunification,
forming a social and democratic state under the rule of law with the clear wish for integration.” And
the final paragraph of this explanation of reasons states: “once and for all, the present Law wishes to
contribute to the healing of wounds still open among Spaniards and to give satisfaction to those citizens
who suffered, directly or through their relatives, the consequences of the tragedy of the Civil War or
the Dictatorship’s repression. It wishes to do so in the complete certainty that, by entering more deeply
into the spirit of reunification and harmony of the Transition, not only will those citizens be recognized
and honored but also the democracy of Spain as a whole. It is not the task of the legislator to implant a
particular collective memory.
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or disagree
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It is useless to debate or take actions to
make amends for incidents that are now past
history.
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The Civil War victims have been the great
forgotten ones, and now it is time to make
amends for this injustice.

53.3
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There were Civil War Victims on both sides,
and any homage paid to them must include
everyone.
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The victims were recognized differently,
depending on which side they belonged to.

65.9
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6.7

17.8
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Figure 2. Sociological Research Center (Madrid) Study. Questions about the recognition of the victims of
the Spanish Civil War (responses in percentages)31.
But it is the duty of the legislator and of the law to compensate the victims, to enshrine and protect with
maximum legal vigor the right to personal and family memory as an expression of complete democratic
citizenship, to nurture constitutional values and to promote the understanding of and reflection on our
past in order to avoid the repetition of situations of intolerance and human rights violations such as those
experienced then.”32
Almost one year after the processing of this initiative, on October 30, 2008, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, a body of independent experts that supervises the implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the member states, after examining the fifth periodic
report presented by Spain, issued, as is usual, its concluding observations. In them, there was praise for what
were considered the positive aspects presented in the report, and it was specifically stated that “the Commission
welcomes with satisfaction Law No. 52/2007, ‘Historical Memory Law,’ which foresaw compensation for
the victims of the dictatorship.” Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, it was stated (this time, among the aspects
regarded as negative) that “although note has been taken of the recent decision of the National Court of Spain
to look into the question of the disappeared, the Commission is concerned by the continuing applicability of
the Amnesty Law of 1977.”
Next, the Commission reminded the Spanish state of the non-applicability of statutory limitations to
crimes against humanity and of the incompatibility of the amnesty laws with the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, as well as with other rulings of international law to which Spain subscribed. Finally,
the critical comments as a whole were summed up in the following recommendation: “The member state
would have to:
a. consider the repeal of the Amnesty Law of 1977;
b. take the legal measures necessary to guarantee recognition of the inability of national courts to
apply statutory limitations to crimes against humanity;
c. foresee the creation of a committee of independent experts charged with restoring historical truth
about the human rights violations committed during the civil war and the dictatorship; and
d. permit the families to identify and exhume the bodies of the victims and, in this case, pay
reparations to the families.”33
In October 2008, the UN Commission was unaware of the course that events were going to take with
regard to “the recent decision of the National Court” to which it referred with satisfaction. Specifically, this
was the famous inquiry opened by the judge Baltasar Garzón, who had decided to use his judicial authority
to investigate a number of complaints lodged by private individuals and by various associations involved in
recovery of historical memory. In the judicial decree of October 2008, the judge said: “The events described and
recounted since July 18, 1936, besides belonging to the category of crimes against humanity, include the crime
of illegal detention, without the authorities and persons responsible for contributing to the disappearance of
the victims having provided the place or the keys to find the location of the bodies, a situation that persists, in
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the great majority of cases, to the present day. That is, without having given information on the whereabouts
of many of the detainees, so that, if the lists were provided and the bodies were found, the crime would cease
to be committed.
Therefore, the point of this investigation, among other objectives, is to put an end to the commission of a
permanent crime.”34 And the Commission could express its satisfaction because it perhaps had not examined
or could not examine the significance of the fact that the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Fiscal) had
given notice of appeal against the decree by which Garzón declared himself competent. Upon being rejected
by the judge himself,35 the appeal moved to the next-higher court, the Criminal Chamber of the National
Court, which by majority shared the prosecution’s opinion.36 Before this decision, Judge Garzón had declined
jurisdiction, deferring to the territorial courts, and the case had been closed in November.37
Later, Baltasar Garzón was accused of breach of legal duty (prevaricación) for having allowed this
lawsuit to proceed initially, and his case was taken to court for oral hearings; finally he was acquitted by the
Supreme Court of Spain. This acquittal, nevertheless, did not prevent the Supreme Court from describing
the “erroneous” proceeding opened by Judge Garzón and making it the ultimate judicial argument for all
the principles of denial from which the Spanish process of transition to democracy arose. Proof of that can
be observed in the following lines: “the fundamental idea of the ‘transition,’ so highly praised nationally and
internationally, was to obtain a peaceful reconciliation among the Spaniards, and both the Amnesty Law and
the Spanish Constitution were extremely important milestones in that historical development.
It must be recalled that the Constitution, which implemented an express repeal of various regulations,
in some way mentions among them the Amnesty Law, which is logical, as it was an essential, irreplaceable,
and necessary foundation for overcoming Francoism and all that Francoism meant. To pursue a peaceful
‘transition’ was no easy task, and what doubt is there that the Amnesty Law also represented an important
indicator to the various sectors of society, so that they would accept certain steps that would have to be taken
in the establishment of the new regime in a peaceful way, avoiding a violent revolution and a return to conflict.
It is precisely because the ‘transition’ was the wish of the Spanish people, articulated in a law, that no judge
or court, in any way, can question the legitimacy of such a process. This is a valid law, whose possible repeal
would be exclusively the responsibility of the Parliament.”38
Epilogue: Neither justice nor history
Historically, societies exposed to their sins have required state-sponsored acts of contrition. In various
cases in Latin America, the new democratic regimes after the end of the genocidal dictatorships hastened
to create a number of “truth commissions,” where the victims and survivors of the violence gave testimony.
Certainly, the course taken by the events following those incidents differs from one country to another,
especially with respect to the legal prosecution of the executioners, but the commissions, like the acts of
contrition, were a preliminary and necessary step to combat the prevailing discourse of denial and to make it
possible to fight against impunity. Little wonder, Julio Cortázar pointed out, that there was the added problem
of the genocides in which the perpetrators were fellow countrymen of the victims: “When disappearance
and torture are handled by people who talk like us, have the same names as ours and have gone to the same
schools, share customs and gestures, come from the same soil and the same history, the abyss that opens in
our own mind and in our heart is infinitely deeper than any word that attempts to describe it.”39
The principal questions posed in this article have to do with the apparent contradictions between the
prevailing discourse about the violence, the Francoist dictatorship, or the political transition to democracy in
Spain, on the one hand, and the reality of the historical facts and Spain’s present, on the other. The responses
to the arguments presented here rely on the discourse of denial upon which Spanish democracy is built. It is
a discourse with which reference is made to various aspects of the ideal identity with which the Spanish state
wishes to identify its own history and its present, and which it communicates through all the resources of
broadcasting, education, and propaganda available to it. That denialist discourse also includes the individual
or collective contributions of Spanish society. The harmony between the official discourse and the majority
social discourse is quite remarkable, at least to the present day.
As part of that discourse of denial in Spanish democracy, an essential spot is occupied by the paradox
of transforming the state itself into the defender of democracy elsewhere in the world. One of the bluntest
expressions of these kinds of interventions dates back to 1983, when the Spanish Senate created a “Special
Commission for Investigation of the Disappearance of Spanish Subjects in the Americas,” which issued a
finding describing the principal characteristics of the “repression” and energetically condemning the denial of
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the right to investigate the facts by the government of the Argentine dictatorship. It was a report that was even
repeated in its main conclusions in 1997, without making any allusion to the obvious comparison with what
occurred in Spain, with respect to the people who disappeared and were killed and the crimes of the Franco
regime in general.40 Thus, the authorization by the principal Spanish courts of the universal principle of justice
inspired by the National Court through the persons of Carlos Castresana and Baltasar Garzón did not arise at
any time from deep awareness of the implications of that principle for the case of Spain, but from its simple
utilization as one more sign of the vitality of Spanish democracy.
The Spanish case does not stand out because of the kind of violence employed or because of the existence
of a later denial that that violence had taken place or had possessed particular characteristics. Nor is it the war
that makes Spain into a different scenario of its own, because the rationale of the conflict and of the victims
by the two sides probably is not a Spanish innovation in its justification or understanding of these kinds of
crimes. It is the analysis of the facts and the almost uniform public discourse that are noteworthy, something
that responds to an unmistakable wish of Spanish society not to confront its worst fears directly.
This attitude can be justified in political terms as an exercise in mutual concession or by invoking the
success of the Transition process, but one must not ignore the direct consequences of what is implied by the
fact that the executioners remain unpunished. The body of the acting gobernador civil of the province of A
Coruña in 1936 continues to occupy an anonymous grave in the cemetery of San Amaro in A Coruña, almost
as if his memory were aware of being a discomfort rather than a cause for democratic cohesion. When they
buried him, his gravediggers left a record in writing that this was now the “ex-gobernador civil.” The body of
his wife lies anonymously in a cemetery in the province of Lugo, with no more mention than a note made in
the civil registry seventy years ago by her executioners themselves. But beyond that, from a historiographical
rather than legal point of view, we completely lack the desire to inquire who their executioners were, what
persons benefited from those deaths, who denounced those who became victims, and what path they followed
later on. The question continues to be the same: Is Spanish society prepared to admit its active participation
in a genocidal practice against its own people?
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